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It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are
mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena ﬁgure into scientiﬁc
practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of
the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that ex-
perimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that
phenomena can ﬁgure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my
analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory re-
search.
1. Introduction. In current philosophy of cognitive science, the following
two assumptions are fairly widespread: ﬁrst, research efforts are mainly di-
rected toward explaining phenomena, and second, the explanations in ques-
tion are likely to be mechanistic. In this article, I do not challenge the impor-
tance of the contributions that the mechanistic approach has made to
philosophical debates about explanation. However, I believe that the litera-
ture about mechanistic explanations has resulted in a skewed picture of re-
search practices in the cognitive and behavioral sciences. In this vein, the
main thesis of my essay is that the primary aim of experimental research
in these ﬁelds is not explanation but rather the description and exploration
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of the relevant subject domain, or as I prefer to put it, of “objects of re-
search.” In a nutshell, philosophers who focus on explanation typically not
only take it for granted that we already know what the relevant explananda
are but also tend to gloss over the problem that the very notion of a phenom-
enon (especially in its relation to experimental data) is not very clear.
In this article, I address these two problems, arguing that the exploration
and conceptualization of both explanantia and explananda are subject to on-
going processes of investigation. Providing an analysis of this process is a
relevant desideratum for philosophy of science. Focusing on psychology,
I will develop such an analysis, which takes into account the experimental
practices of researchers in these ﬁelds. In particular, I will argue that exper-
imental effects play an important role in these practices but that this role does
not consist in exemplifying explanandum phenomena. Rather, they function
as evidence that is drawn on in constructing descriptive accounts of the rel-
evant objects of research. I will defend my use of the term “object of re-
search” over the (more common) term “phenomenon” to indicate that objects
of research are more ﬂuid and can in principle be composed of more than one
phenomenon.
In section 2, I begin by explaining what I mean by an object of research.
Drawing on a case study about working memory, I will illustrate a central
feature of such “objects”: that they are (as I will call it) “epistemically blurry.”
By this, I mean that from the perspective of practicing scientists, their nature
and identity conditions are not well understood. Section 3 will distinguish the
expression “object of research” from the more commonly used “phenome-
non,” arguing that in the existing literature the latter term is used in an ambig-
uous fashion, which can result in the conﬂation of several distinct philosoph-
ical issues, thereby detracting from some of the roles that phenomena play in
research. Section 4 will turn to a critique of the mechanists’ juxtaposition of
phenomena and mechanisms, with regard to both explanation and discovery.
I will argue that this juxtaposition does not provide a satisfactory gloss of the
role of phenomena in the investigative practices of psychology and that my
own account is more promising in this regard.
2. On the Notion of an Object of Research. I use the expression “object
of research” as distinct from “phenomenon” to describe the fact that psy-
chologists often take their research to be relevant to some overarching sub-
ject matter (e.g., memory, emotion, attention). By contrast, I use the term
“phenomenon” to refer to more conﬁned empirical patterns.1 In this section,
I explain my contention that scientiﬁc activities in psychology are often di-
rected toward some (presumed) overarching research object, where this in-
1. Below, I will provide a more in-depth account of my use of “phenomena,” building
upon analyses by Hacking (1983), Bogen and Woodward (1988), and Feest (2011b).
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volves the recognition that there is still a great deal of conceptual openness
with regard to the contours of this object.
2.1. Objects of Research as Epistemically Blurry. We typically think
of objects as three-dimensional things in the world, clearly delineated from
their environments. Objects of research in psychology are not like that. Take
memory, for example. First, while there is little doubt among researchers that
memory is a legitimate object of scientiﬁc investigation, memory is not a
physical object in the usual sense. Second, I claim that psychologists study
memory in part because they are not entirely sure about its shape and con-
tours (or even, perhaps, about whether at the end of the day this will be a vi-
able scientiﬁc kind). Put differently, when we put ourselves in the epistemic
position of practicing scientists, it is clear that they are not (or at least not
exclusively or even primarily) in the business of explaining some already
clearly delineated phenomenon. Rather, much of their empirical work is di-
rected toward ﬁguring out what they are actually investigating. Following
Feest (2011a), I therefore refer to such objects of research as “epistemically
blurry.”
With this thesis I do not mean to deny that ultimately the point of catego-
ries like “memory” is to explain behavior. In this vein, my approach is some-
what compatible with more traditional philosophy of psychology, according
to which memory is a theoretical concept (an explanans), put into place to
explain certain types of behaviors (explanandum phenomena). However,
as I hope to make clearer in the course of this article, I think that this way
of carving up the ﬁeld (by dividing it into explananda, which are clearly de-
lineated, and explanantia, which are to be determined) does not lend itself
to an adequate analysis of the research process itself, which is importantly
concerned with making taxonomic constructs and attempting to describe
distinctive features of the (purported) objects in their extension. When I
say that objects of research are epistemically blurry, I do not mean that sci-
entists lack a theoretical explanation for an already clearly delineated em-
pirical explanandum but that the very question that empirical data are even
descriptively relevant to the object in question is part of the investigative
project. Thus, it is my contention that often explanation is not the most im-
mediate concern of experimental research in cognitive science.
I use the expression “object of research” to indicate the presumption of a
research target that is independent of our own conceptualizations. Notice,
though, that I am not committed to the claim that this presumption will pan
out in every case. There may well be cases in which the “object” in question
will turn out not to possess the inductive projectability required of a scientiﬁc
kind. In that case, wewill probably see the terms being eliminated in the long
run. At the same time, this expression is also supposed to indicate that such
(presumed) objects are research targets only by virtue of the fact that we di-
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rect our epistemic attention to them and hence that we tentatively use some
concepts to describe our subject matter. The research process, as I construe it
here, is thus one of simultaneously exploring a speciﬁc subject domain and of
applying, revising, and extending existing concepts. In this respect, the out-
look taken here is not so dissimilar from Wilson’s (2006) study of the often
unpredictable behavior of conceptswhen confrontedwith, or extended to, pre-
viously unimagined physical domains or circumstances.
2.2. Short-Term Memory as an Object of Research. I believe that the
rough gloss just provided can make sense of research practices we encounter
in psychology, where a great deal of time and effort are spent trying to arrive
at adequate descriptions of the presumed research objects. Consider the ex-
ample of working memory, which is typically thought of, or modeled, as a
stage of information processing before items get committed to long-term
memory (see, e.g., Baddeley and Hitch [1974] for a classic formulation).2
I claim that the point of this model is that of delineating and empirically de-
scribing a particular object of research (workingmemory) in relation to long-
termmemory. To be sure, such work is theoretical, but it does not follow that
its immediate aim is explanation. Rather, the empirical research in question
aims at gaining a better descriptive understanding of the very objects under
investigation.
Let me quickly illustrate the nature of such research (and thereby also
of the epistemic blurriness of the research object in question) by looking
at debates about two descriptive features long taken to be characteristic of
short-term memory: duration and capacity, where the duration was thought
to be about 10 to 20 seconds and the capacity 7 ± 2 (Miller 1956). The term
“working memory capacity” refers to the number of items that can be stored
in working memory at any given time. When talking about efforts to deter-
mine working memory capacity as illustrating my notion of an epistemically
blurry research object, what I have in mind is not the fact that there is some
variation between different individuals’workingmemory capacities but rather
that it is not a trivial (i.e., straightforwardly empirical) question how to deter-
mine a ﬁgure like 7 ± 2. When scientists run a psychological experiment, by
what rationale do they determine how many memory items are indicated by
any given subject’s experimental response? My claim here is that these are
questions that are quite central to researchers’ debates about their subject
matter.
2. The authors introduced the expression “working memory,” indicating a conceptual
shift away from the earlier “short-term memory.” The details of this shift cannot be cov-
ered here. This article will mainly use “working memory,” except when referring to Mil-
ler (1956).
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One reason why the question of how to determine working memory ca-
pacity is not trivial has to do with a particular phenomenon thought to be rel-
evant to short-term (or working) memory: the phenomenon of chunking
(Miller 1956). According to the chunking hypothesis, working memory ca-
pacity is ﬁxed. However, once chunking takes place, the amount of informa-
tion that can be kept in working memory radically increases, because the
items are now composed of chunks of smaller items. If we want to describe
working memory capacity, chunking will inevitably pose obstacles, since
the capacity limit may well be inﬂated by the effects of chunking. Thus,
in order to produce an adequate measure of capacity, we need to ensure that
we have away of empirically identifying the chunks (as opposed to their parts)
that subjects keep in working memory. None of these are explanatory ques-
tions. They are, rather, theoretical and methodological questions about how
to investigate and describe a given object of research.
Cowan (2000), in an inﬂuential paper (in which he argues that Miller’s
famous 7 ± 2 estimate should be corrected downward to 4 ± 1), tries to develop
a method for distinguishing between memory chunks and the total number of
items stored inmemory, arguing that chunks are associations between concepts
and that one needs to control for items that are already “chunked” in long-term
memory. However, as the peer responses to Cowan’s article show, there are also
problemswith this approach. For example, one question that comes up is how it
can be established that higher-order coding has in fact been prevented (Beaman
2000, 118), suggesting that Cowan is begging the question by presupposing a
particular understanding of chunking. Others argue that Cowan’s theoretical
deﬁnition of a chunk is too weak (Halford, Phillips, andWilson 2000; Milner
2000; Pascual-Leone 2000). Yet others worry whether empirical ﬁndings
about chunking can be generalized across modalities (Schubert and Frensch
2000, 146).
I take the debate to be one about how to adequately describe a particular
feature (storage capacity) of a speciﬁc research object (working memory).
My aim here is not to take sides in the debate but to use it to illustrate my
thesis that scientists are often concerned with providing descriptions of re-
search objects and that there is frequently a great deal of epistemic uncer-
tainty about the objects in question.
3. Phenomena versus Objects of Research. In contrast to my talk of ob-
jects of research, philosophers often refer to things like memory, attention,
emotion, and so forth, as “phenomena.”While I certainly do not want to po-
lice the way this term is used, I argue that the term “phenomenon” is being
used ambiguously in the philosophical literature and that for the purposes of
an analysis of the research process, my notion of an object of research is a
useful complement.
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3.1. Two Meanings of “Phenomena.”. According to Bogen and Wood-
ward, phenomena are “relatively stable and general features of the world”
(Woodward 1988), which “have stable, repeatable characteristics” (Bogen
and Woodward 1989, 393). In this vein, one might suppose that memory
is a phenomenon that has certain repeatable characteristics, such as the char-
acteristic of chunking. However, when we look at the examples provided, it
is clear that Bogen andWoodward regard the chunking effect itself as a phe-
nomenon, not simply as a characteristic of some other phenomenon. So, it
seems that they use the term in two distinct senses: (1) as a stable feature or
kind that has repeatable characteristics and (2) as simply a repeatable reg-
ularity.
I contend that by running these two senses together, we give up an im-
portant analytical distinction, a distinction that will help us—among other
things—clarify how objects of research are conceptualized in psychology,
why they are epistemically blurry, and (most importantly) how they are in-
vestigated. In this vein, I suggest restricting the use of the term “phenom-
enon” to things like the chunking effect, the melting point of lead, and other
events that occur regularly under speciﬁed circumstances. Now, it is cer-
tainly conceivable that such types of phenomena can become objects of re-
search in the sense outlined above; that is, scientists can turn their epistemic
attention to them, explore them, probe them by varying the experimental con-
ditions under which they occur, and so forth. However, I contend that objects
of research in psychology are often more variegated than that. For example, I
suggest that scientists think of working memory as a cluster of phenomena,
such as chunking, encoding, retrieval, duration. Thinking of objects of re-
search in thisway highlights once againwhatmakes them epistemically blurry:
they are epistemically blurry both because the phenomena they are thought
to be composed of are ill understood in their own right and because the ways
in which those phenomena are related to one another are ill understood as
well. Figuring out the exact contours of an object of research involves pro-
viding descriptions of the various phenomena tentatively thought to consti-
tute the object of research and providing an account of how they hang to-
gether.
3.2. Phenomena versus Effects?. My use of the term “phenomenon”
includes regularities both at the experimental level and at the level of pro-
cesses presumed to exist independently of experimental creation. In this
respect, my account differs from Bogen and Woodward’s (1988), who ar-
gued that phenomena are mind-independent regularities in the world, to
be distinguished from experimental data, which are idiosyncratic to spe-
ciﬁc experimental contexts. My account also differs from Hacking’s (1983)
contention that phenomena often only exist under the very speciﬁc experi-
mental circumstances of their creation. Responding to statements such as this
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one, in turn, Bogen and Woodward suggested that what Hacking referred to
as phenomena were really data in their sense.
The distinction is not so clear, however. I argue that experimental effects
should be considered phenomena. Consider the chunking effect. Bogen and
Woodward use this as an example of a phenomenon by virtue of its stability
and repeatability and by virtue of the assumption that it exists “in the
world.” Nonetheless, it is also clearly an experimental effect. Experimental
effects, insofar as they are stable and repeatable, are phenomena in the sense
I use the term here. Hence, I argue that phenomena can occur on a scale be-
tween the context-speciﬁc and local and the context-transcendent (see Feest
[2011b] for a similar point), although it is typically assumed that local ef-
fects instantiate context-transcendent ones. If, as I contend here, objects
of research (such as the presumed referents of the taxonomic categories in
psychology) are often composed of multiple phenomena, the question is
how can experimentally produced phenomena contribute to the ways in
which objects of research are described and constructed. I argue that exper-
imentally created phenomena often function as evidence in the course of sci-
entiﬁc attempts to provide empirical descriptions of objects of research. In
this vein, I suggest a shift away from the prevailing concern with phenomena
as explananda toward a consideration of phenomena as experimental evi-
dence (see also Cummins 2000).
At ﬁrst sight, this latter claim (that phenomena can function as evidence)
may be seen as ﬂying in the face of the very distinction at the heart of Bogen
and Woodward’s account, namely, that between phenomena (which are the
explananda of general theory) and data (which are thought to provide evi-
dence in favor of speciﬁc phenomena). While this distinction is very instruc-
tive, I think the notion of an object of research puts into sharper relief what
purposes experimental evidence serves in the ﬁrst place. And while I agree
with Bogen and Woodward that experimental data are typically not ex-
plananda, this does not mean that they are not phenomena. It just means that
in the context of research practices in psychology, phenomena are not al-
ways “objects of discovery and explanation,” as Bogen and Woodward ini-
tially thought. They are, rather, evidence in relation to particular descriptive
questions about objects of research.
I also wish to highlight that the local and context-speciﬁc phenomena that
are created as part of the investigation of speciﬁc objects of research are—at
least for the duration of the research process—conceptually tied to the re-
search object in question. Put differently, experimentally produced phenom-
ena can function as evidence in relation to speciﬁc objects of research, be-
cause of an (however preliminary and defeasible) assumption that they are
relevant to this object of research.
In this regard, consider, again, the chunking effect. Qua experimental ef-
fect it is possible to use it to gather data about an object of research precisely
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because of the assumption that the empirical effect of chunking provides ep-
istemic access to some presumed cognitive process of chunking, which in
turn is thought to be a central descriptive feature of working memory. Notice
that these assumptions, however tentative, already need to be in place in or-
der to even investigate issues like the capacity of working memory, thereby
highlighting what I have in mind when I speak of working memory as an
example of an epistemically blurry research object.
4. Phenomena versus Mechanisms? Having outlined my account of ob-
jects of research as the targets of scientists’ investigative efforts, as well as
the role played by phenomena, I will now argue that mechanistic accounts in
cognitive science are too narrowly ﬁxated on explanations andmoreover op-
erate with an unclear and ambiguous conception of “phenomenon.”Reading
these approaches against the grain, this section will argue that my account of
phenomena and objects of research promises to provide a more adequate
analysis of the investigative process.
4.1. Phenomena as the Explananda of Mechanistic Explanations. Carl
Craver, Bill Bechtel, and other philosophers of neuroscience, when using the
term “phenomenon,” often do so in the context of talking about mechanistic
explanation, where by “phenomena” they typically mean explanandum phe-
nomena. There are three problems with this. First, the notion of phenome-
non, as it is used in this literature, is not entirely clear. Second (and relatedly),
it is typically not explicated what the relevant explanandum phenomena
of a given mechanistic explanation are. Third, even with a reasonable con-
strual of the explananda of psychological research, I will argue in a mo-
ment that the research process is still not very well portrayed as being fo-
cused on explanation.
Consider Craver’s (2007) well-known discussion of spatial memory as an
object of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. Central assumptions about
spatial memory are that it enables us to navigate in space, that it involves spa-
tial maps, and that suchmaps are formed in the hippocampus bymeans of the
mechanism of long-term potentiation. Now, given Craver’s claim that this is
a good example of how mechanistic explanations function in cognitive neu-
roscience, we may ask what the explanandum phenomenon is in this case.
The answer Craver and Darden (2001, 121) give to this question is that “the
phenomenon to be explained” is “spatial memory,” suggesting that it will be
explained by a multilevel mechanism. However, this explication of the ex-
planandum phenomenon does not ﬁt well with their notion of phenomenon
a few pages earlier, where they suggest that they use the term “phenomenon”
in the sense of Bogen and Woodward (1988), “as relatively stable and repeat-
able properties or activities that can be produced, manipulated or detected in a
variety of experimental arrangements” (Craver and Darden 2001, 114). As
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examples, they name “the acquisition, storage, and retrieval of spatial memo-
ries; the release of neurotransmitters, and the generation of action potentials.”
Notice that all of these “phenomena” are more speciﬁc and conﬁned than “the
phenomenon” of spatial memory, thus raising the question what precisely the
authors take to be the explanandum phenomenon of this research.
It seems to me that the authors run together two meanings of “phenome-
non” outlined above, that is, on the one hand, speciﬁc regularities presumed
to belong to a research object (acquisition, storage, retrieval, etc., and perhaps
also patterns of search behavior of rats in mazes) and, on the other hand,
more complex objects (e.g., spatial memory), conceivably composed of
many speciﬁc regularities. Related to this, they also do not clearly distin-
guish between two possible (kinds of ) explananda of psychology, namely,
(1) the behavioral regularities triggered by particular experimental setups
and (2) the capacity of an organism to execute a variety of behaviors in more
complex environments (see Chow [2015] for a similar point). I will now
brieﬂy consider each of these two candidate explanandum phenomena, argu-
ing that the former are often used as empirical data in support of speciﬁc de-
scriptions of the latter.
We begin with the ﬁrst interpretation of explanandum phenomenon. There
are several possible readings of Craver’s (2007, 165) claim that the naviga-
tional behavior of mice is “the spatial memory phenomenon.” First, scien-
tists might actually want to explain a particular experimental mouse’s behav-
ior. Second, they want to explain the behaviors of mice more generally,
extrapolating from an explanation of experimental mice behavior to an ex-
planation of the behavior of mice in the wild. Third, they want to explain hu-
man navigational behavior, extrapolating from the explanation of experi-
mental mice behavior to the explanation of human behavior. Now, again, I
am not questioning the assumption that we ultimately want the concept of
spatial memory to be an explanatory construct. Nor do I (in this article) ques-
tion mechanistic accounts of explanation. What I do question, however, is
the underlying assumption that experimentally generated phenomena, such
as the stable and repeatable regularities of navigational behavior exhibited
by mice in mazes, are typically intended to instantiate explananda. Instead,
I suggest that they are created to provide evidence in favor of particular de-
scriptive accounts of spatial memory, understood here as an object of re-
search in the sense outlined above.
This brings me to my second interpretation of “the explanandum phe-
nomenon of spatial memory,” according to which the explananda in cogni-
tive science are often not isolated behavioral phenomena but the complex
behavioral capacities themselves. Craver (2007) distances himself from
Cummins’s use of the term “capacity,” but it strikes me as fairly innocuous,
as long as we appreciate that the term can be understood as either (1) refer-
ring to an explanandum phenomenon (a complex behavioral capacity of a
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system) or (2) a placeholder for a detailed descriptive account of a multi-
level mechanism (i.e., an explanans). Here, my interest is in the former. I
argue that once we are asking what a given behavioral capacity really is,
we are inquiring into the empirical characteristics of an elusive research
object, and the answer is not simply going to be a matter of ﬁlling in the
mechanical details of an already clearly delineated explanandum. Again,
this draws our attention to the fact that what is at stake here are taxonomic
and descriptive questions. In the context of ongoing research, I claim, ex-
perimentally generated instances of phenomena often function as evidence
with regard to accounts of speciﬁc behavioral capacities, not as explananda
of mechanistic explanations.
4.2. Phenomena and Mechanisms as Objects of Discovery. It is to the
credit of mechanist philosophers that they have put not only explanation
but also discovery on the agenda of philosophy of science (e.g., Bechtel
and Richardson 1993; see also Darden 2006; Bechtel 2008; Craver and
Darden 2013). In this context, Bechtel and Richardson have early on high-
lighted the conceptual openness of the research process, suggesting that
phenomena frequently get “reconstituted” in the course of their investiga-
tion. It is noticeable, though, that these works are very much focused on
the discovery of (explanatory) mechanisms, thus leaving intact the basic idea
that the explanation of phenomena, rather than the description of research
objects, is the main focus of research.
Awidely held assumption in the literature is not only that phenomena are
the explananda of mechanistic explanations but also that the discovery of
mechanisms typically proceeds by way of constructing “higher level” (phe-
nomenological) descriptions of the relevant explanandum phenomena, with
the aim of later supplying the mechanistic explanation, which in turn can
“reconstitute” the explanandum phenomenon (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson
1993). In a similar vein, Craver and Darden (2001, 2013) describe the pro-
cess of discovery as a process of “going down one level” to search for the
mechanisms and “going up one level” to try to describe again precisely what
the mechanisms do (i.e., to describe again the phenomenon).
This seems like a sensible idea, and the authors provide some nice illus-
trations of how this can work (pointing to top-down experiments that manip-
ulate rats/mice at the behavioral level and observe effects on the level of the
brain and, vice versa, bottom-up experiments). However, I argue that this ac-
count at best captures a small part of research practices that play a role in
discovery in memory research, which puts a lot of effort into obtaining em-
pirical descriptions of the research objects and the phenomena that pertain to
them. As an example of such descriptive questions, recall the discussion in
section 2.2 about duration and capacity as descriptive features of working
memory.
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I suggest that, in spatial memory research, too, there are a host of unre-
solved descriptive questions of the following kinds: How literally should
the metaphor of the spatial map be interpreted? Are spatial maps more like
images or like architectural models? Are they accurate? Are they consistent?
Insofar as there are distortions in spatial memory, what are these distortions
caused by? What are cognitive reference points for spatial information, and
how can they vary by context? Do spatial maps encode perspective, or do
they represent a bird’s-eye view? These are questions that have been raised
in the spatial knowledge literature in the past 20 years or so. In this vein,
one psychologist has argued that “despite its considerable appeal, as tradi-
tionally used, the ‘cognitive map’ metaphor does not reﬂect the complexity
and richness of environmental knowledge. That knowledge comes in a va-
riety of forms, memory snippets of maps we’ve seen, routes we’ve taken, ar-
eas we’ve heard or read about, facts about distances or directions” (Tversky
1993, 21).
This quotation expresses the sentiments I have tried to argue for in this
article, as it does not talk about mechanisms or explanations. Rather, the au-
thor raises descriptive questions about a research object that is not very well
understood or that is, as I have called it in this article, epistemically blurry.
While I cannot pursue this case study here, I suggest that it offers a glimpse
into the kinds of descriptive questions psychologists often concern them-
selves with, raising philosophical issues about the ways in which experimen-
tally produced phenomena are used in their research.
5. Conclusion. I have questioned the common assumption that the inves-
tigative practices in cognitive science are directed toward (the discovery of )
mechanistic explanations of phenomena and have instead drawn attention
to the fact that (1) the exact contours of the relevant explanandum phenom-
ena are often not clearly deﬁned and (2) the very notion of a phenomenon
remains contested and ambiguous in the philosophy of science literature. In
this vein, I have argued that the research process is better analyzed as one
that tries to construct adequate descriptions of epistemically blurry objects
of research (such as working memory or spatial memory), and I have pro-
vided the outline of an analysis of the ways in which experimentally cre-
ated phenomena ﬁgure in this process.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that I do not wish to downplay the im-
portance of explanations for science or for philosophy of science. However,
if we aim for philosophical accounts of scientiﬁc practice, we are well ad-
vised to take a closer look at some other concerns and questions researchers
in fact struggle with. I suggest that my account of the investigative process
as focused on what I call epistemically blurry objects of research offers a
fruitful novel account of the types of questions that arise at the intersection
of theoretical and methodological debates in psychology.
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